How will the AA capture Sittwe, Potential Tactic and strategy?

This article is exclusive insight of How will the AA capture Sittwe, Potential Tactic and strategy: The Arakan Army (AA) has been frequently shelling Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State, which is heavily fortified by the military junta, from areas under its control in Rathedaung and Pauktaw Townships.

In early February, the AA launched artillery strikes targeting military camps in Padaleik and Myint Kyun villages, located across the river from Rathedaung Township near Sittwe. Additionally, it fired at the Shwe Mingan naval base near Pauktaw Township.

The AA’s Western Regional Military Command, stationed in Sittwe, consists of between four and eight battalions of mobile and infantry forces deployed from the captured town of Ann and the Northwestern Regional Military Command.

Given the military’s stronghold on Sittwe with both ground and naval forces, how is the AA approaching its offensive?

How Did the Clashes Around Sittwe Begin?

Sittwe is naturally surrounded by rivers, creeks, and lakes, making it resemble an island city. This geographical condition limits the AA’s ability to launch a large-scale ground offensive directly into the city.

However, after capturing Gwa Township, the AA has been gradually advancing from Rathedaung and Pauktaw in an attempt to enter Sittwe, according to military analysts.

In late 2024, junta forces in Sittwe Township launched artillery attacks on AA-controlled Rathedaung and Pauktaw.

By early January 2025, clashes erupted between the AA and the military near Pauktaw, with the AA attacking junta bases in Aung Myay Kone and Yeyyopyin. The military responded with heavy and small arms fire, while naval forces also provided support, as reported by junta-aligned Telegram channels.

On January 16, the military carried out artillery shelling and airstrikes on villages in Pauktaw Township, including Spay Htar, Aung Zeya, Kan Chaung, and Kywe Toe.

Following these attacks, the AA intensified its offensives toward Sittwe, leading to continuous battles from February 7 to 9. Some analysts believe that the AA is preparing to capture Sittwe using a combination of frontal assaults and flanking maneuvers.

The military is fighting back with its own weapons.

In the battles taking place within the Sittwe Township, the heavy weapons used by the AA (Arakan Army) are not their own purchased weapons, according to a military source on the ground.

“The weapons are from the military council, captured in urban battles. We can’t afford these heavy weapons. They are also firing with howitzers. There are also 24-round launchers. We can’t say where they are firing from, but it’s somewhere outside the town,” said an AA military source.

The 24-round launchers, which fire 122mm rockets, can reach further and are more accurate, according to CDM Captain Zin Yaw.

“If we don’t use these heavy weapons now, when will we? I see it as a strategy to fight with heavy firepower to save the energy of the ground troops. The bombs we have are nearing their expiration date. We are fighting back with what we captured from the military council to conserve manpower,” he said.

According to locals in Sittwe, the fighting on February 8th and 9th was intense.

Within Sittwe Township, there are over 20 military units, including the Regional Operations Command (ROC), Infantry Battalions No. 20 and 232, Field Engineering Battalion No. 908, and police battalions.

The AA targeted the positions of the military council’s Infantry Battalion No. 232 and Police Battalion No. 36 within Sittwe Township with heavy weapons.

Locals also reported that the military council’s Infantry Battalion No. 20 retaliated by firing towards the townships of Rathedaung and Ponnagyun.

How is the Military Council Preparing its Defenses in Sittwe?

The Military Council has been preparing its defenses in Sittwe since the Arakan Army (AA) launched its offensive in Rakhine State in November 2023. Locals say that since then, the city’s security has been significantly tightened.
>“They have been holding meetings with Sittwe residents, warning them that if fighting breaks out, their well-fortified homes will be occupied by Snaike (militia) troops, and homeowners must allow this,” a Sittwe resident explained, describing the Military Council’s military preparations.

Following the Military Council’s raids in June 2024, which resulted in the deaths of dozens of villagers in Byaing Phyu, the Military Council ordered the relocation of residents from over 20 Rakhine villages along the coast to Sittwe.

“The AA has been entering villages and gathering strength, so the Military Council is forcing villagers to relocate to prevent the AA from spreading its forces. Only Rakhine villages are being relocated, not Muslim villages,” the resident added.

No arrangements have been made to accommodate the relocated villagers in Sittwe. They are staying in monasteries and managing their own expenses as best as they can.

While locals were previously aware of the Military Council’s naval reinforcements, the recent relocation of villages near naval bases has made it difficult to gauge the extent of these reinforcements.

It is clear that the Military Council’s preparations are aimed at preventing AA troops from reaching Sittwe.

How important is Sittwe?

Sittwe District, located in the Kula Tan River area, has access to maritime routes from Sittwe Port, Shwe Min Gan Port, and Satyauk Port to Butti Taung, Yathe Taung, Ponnar Island, Kyauk Taw, and the northern part. However, due to military control in these areas, there are restrictions on travel according to the current military situation.

The Kula Tan River Project, which collaborates with India, is also located in Sittwe, making it possible to link internationally.

In Sittwe District, there is also a border trade station between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Before November 13, 2023, when fighting between the military and resistance groups erupted in Rakhine State, the military junta was able to conduct transactions worth millions of US dollars weekly, as seen in customs records.

These records show that the military junta has been receiving large sums of dollars annually from the border ports of Sittwe.

Sittwe has an airport, and while it is used for air travel, air routes to most cities in Rakhine have been restricted after the military took control. Currently, only flights to Sittwe-Yangon-Kyaukphyu are operating.

In terms of road access, it is possible to travel from Ponnar Island, Kyauk Taw, Maungdaw, and Am to Yangon, but the routes are blocked by the military.

Sittwe also hosts foreign investment projects, including those from China and India, and serves as a seaport.

Therefore, the military junta considers Sittwe not only a strategic economic point but also essential for maintaining the prestige of the military, and they have taken strong measures to protect it, according to some military analysts.

However, due to international projects being located in the port area, the military zone has not extended to the city center, as it is difficult for these projects to operate freely.

Currently, the military only controls Sittwe, Mrauk U, and Ramthwae in the Rakhine region. As a result, the military is actively working with international investors in the state and has informed them about the situation.

Thus, it is understood that the military is committed to managing these international projects carefully to prevent any disruption.

On the other hand, if the military junta plans to launch a military offensive on Sittwe, it is expected to be much more intense compared to other city sieges, given the strong military presence in the city. (BBC)

Here are some more potential How will the AA capture Sittwe?

The Arakan Army’s (AA) potential capture of Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State and a strategic stronghold of the Myanmar Military Council, would likely depend on a combination of military strategy, resource mobilization, political maneuvering, and local support. Based on current dynamics and past patterns of conflict in Rakhine, here are key factors that could shape the AA’s approach:

1. Urban Warfare and Siege Tactics (AA capture Sittwe)

• Avoiding direct frontal assaults: Sittwe is heavily fortified, with over 20 military bases (including infantry, artillery, and naval units). The AA may focus on isolating the city by cutting supply routes (land and river) to weaken the Military Council’s logistics and morale.
• Targeting key installations: Neutralizing critical bases (e.g., Regional Operations Command, Infantry Battalion 20, naval facilities) with long-range artillery, drones, or captured heavy weapons (e.g., 122mm rockets) could degrade the Military Council’s command structure.
• Proxy skirmishes: Using smaller guerrilla units to harass military outposts and stretch the Military Council’s forces thin.

2. Exploiting Local Support

• Ethnic Rakhine solidarity: The AA enjoys significant grassroots support in Rakhine. Locals could provide intelligence, logistical aid, or even join AA ranks during a decisive push.
• Psychological pressure: By framing the battle as a “liberation” struggle, the AA could demoralize Military Council troops and encourage defections (similar to CDM participation elsewhere in Myanmar).

3. Heavy Weapons and External Supplies

• Captured weapons: The AA has reportedly used weapons seized from the Military Council (howitzers, 24-round rocket launchers) to offset its lack of airpower. Sustained artillery barrages could soften defenses.
• Cross-border logistics: If the AA receives smuggled arms or ammunition from neighboring countries (e.g., India, Bangladesh, or via Chin State), it could sustain prolonged operations.

4. Coordination with Allied Forces for AA capture Sittwe

• Joint operations: Partnering with anti-junta forces like the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) or ethnic armed groups (e.g., Chinland Defense Force) could open secondary fronts, diverting the Military Council’s resources.
• Naval disruptions: Blocking Military Council riverine reinforcements via the Kaladan River or Bay of Bengal would require coordination with coastal allies.

5. Attrition and Timing

• Wearing down defenses: The AA may prolong the siege to exhaust the Military Council’s ammunition, food, and medical supplies. This strategy worked in previous AA victories (e.g., Paletwa, Pauktaw).
• Expiration of Military Council munitions: The AA has claimed it is using captured “expired” artillery shells, suggesting urgency to exploit weakening enemy stockpiles.

Challenges for the AA capture Sittwe

• Urban combat risks: Street-by-street fighting in Sittwe would incur heavy civilian casualties and damage infrastructure, eroding local goodwill.
• Air and naval superiority: The Military Council can deploy jets, helicopters, and naval vessels to bombard AA positions.
• Resource limitations: The AA’s reliance on captured weapons leaves it vulnerable to supply shortages.
• International scrutiny: A prolonged battle could attract global attention, complicating the AA’s political goals.

Likely Scenarios

• Staged encirclement: The AA might prioritize capturing surrounding townships (e.g., Rathedaung, Ponnagyun) first, isolating Sittwe before launching a final assault.
• Negotiated surrender: If the siege succeeds, defections or a negotiated withdrawal by the Military Council (as seen in northern Shan State with the TNLA) could occur.
• Political symbolism: Even if Sittwe isn’t fully captured, holding parts of the city could cement the AA’s legitimacy as Rakhine’s de facto governing force.

Conclusion

The AA’s success hinges on balancing military precision, local support, and strategic patience. While capturing Sittwe would be a monumental blow to the Military Council, the AA is more likely to pursue a gradual, resource-conscious campaign rather than a high-risk frontal assault. The city’s fall would mark a turning point in Myanmar’s civil war, but the human and political costs will shape the AA’s approach.